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New Economy—
New Policy Rules?




nited States economic performance during
the latter portion of the 1990s far exceeded
even optimistic forecasts. From 1996
through 2000, nonfarm business sector productivity
grew by about 3.0 percent per year, on average. In
the ten years previous to this period, from 1986
through 1995, it had increased at an average rate of
only 1.4 percent per year. The late 1990s coincided
with a spell of accelerated progress in computer
technology and a widening adoption of the Internet
by businesses and consumers. U.S. real output
increased about 4.3 percent per year, on average,
from 1996 through 2000, while, at the same time,
inflation pressures remained rather subdued, with
the personal consumption expenditures price index
increasing at an average rate of only about 1.9
percent per year.
Economists in the United States have been cogni-
zant of these changing trends. Many commentators
have argued that technological change may be
increasing American productivity, making it possible
for the economy to grow at a faster rate without
creating inflation. And, in fact, Federal Reserve
officials have made many such arguments in recent
years. Consider, for example, the May 6, 1999,
Congressional testimony by Federal Reserve Chair-
man Alan Greenspan: “…the evidence appears to be
mounting that, even if productivity does not con-
tinue to accelerate, the pickup already observed
does seem to explain much of the extraordinary
containment of inflation despite the ever-tightening
labor markets of recent years.” The next day the
Washington Post reported: “Greenspan said the
unexpected jump in productivity is the major rea-
son that for the past three years so many forecasters,
including those at the Fed, have underestimated
economic growth while overestimating inflation.”
This set of events is sometimes collectively
called “the new economy,” and we will use this
meaning of the term for the purposes of this paper.
Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in the
New Economy
The U.S. monetary policy debate has been
importantly influenced by Taylor (1993), who argued
that simple, nominal interest rate–based monetary
policy rules might produce good stabilization per-
formance.1 Taylor’s (1993) ideas were based on a
given, constant inflation target for the monetary
authorities and, especially important for this paper,
a given, constant long-run level of productivity.
Nearly all rules in this literature are then specified
relative to these fundamental objects. In addition,
Taylor’s (1993) analysis was not of an optimal pol-
icy rule, but of an ad hoc rule that Taylor reasoned
would perform well based on historical experience.
Svensson (1997) showed how a version of the Taylor
rule could be viewed as the optimal monetary policy
rule in a simple dynamic macroeconomic model,
again for a given inflation target and a given under-
lying level of productivity. In addition, the papers
in the Taylor (1999) volume generally favor the idea
that something close to optimal stabilization perfor-
mance could be obtained by adhering to a Taylor
rule, across a wide variety of macroeconomic models.
However, one of the key “new economy” events
is the shift in productivity. It seems natural that a
fully optimal monetary policy rule would take
account of the changing nature of the supply side.
Our main goal in this paper is to derive an optimal
monetary policy rule in an environment with un-
observed shifting productivity, so that the policy
authorities must infer the underlying regime from
observed data. We wish to accomplish this in the
simplest possible framework, but one in which we
are sure that a Taylor-type rule would be optimal
were it not for the productivity changes. Accordingly,
we adopt Svensson’s (1997) model as a baseline,
and we augment the model with two-state regime
switching in the level of long-run productivity. We
wish to understand how a Taylor-type rule would
have to be altered to allow for the possibility that
underlying productivity shifts may occur. Although
1 For some of the related recent research on monetary policy rules, see
Taylor (1999), King and Plosser (1999), and Clarida, Gali, and, Gertler
(1999).
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and Charles Hokayem provided research assistance.we use this model to keep our exposition relatively
simple, we also think that it is reasonably clear that
the basic findings here would hold in far more
elaborate models.
Main Results
Our main finding is that the optimal policy rule
in an environment with unobserved productivity
shifts involves important lagged terms in inflation
and the output gap. The role of these lagged terms
is to help the policy authority react with appropriate
interest rate adjustments when unobserved shifts
in underlying productivity occur. In certain special
cases, our optimal policy rule collapses to Svensson’s
(1997) rule for the same model, which involves only
contemporaneous data. These special cases occur
when (i) the probability of remaining in each regime
is exactly one-half, so that productivity regimes are
not persistent and can be interpreted simply as
noise, or (ii) when the levels of productivity in the
two regimes approach one another, so that there is
effectively no difference between the two regimes.
Intuitively, we think our main finding is an impor-
tant one that would extend to a wide variety of
models: In the face of possible unobserved changes
in regime, the policy authority must optimally con-
sider recent trends in the data to infer whether the
regime shift has occurred.
While our main results are analytical, we also
consider a calibration of the model in order to fix
ideas and provide illustrations of our findings.
Adhering to a Taylor-type rule as derived by Svensson
(1997) when there are, in fact, unobserved switches
in productivity regimes implies significantly worse
macroeconomic performance, relative to the optimal
rule that we derive. Policymakers using a Svensson-
Taylor rule would typically observe inflation that
is persistently above or below target. This would
appear to them to be due to unobserved special
factors. But, with the optimal rule, inflation remains
near target at all times and output fluctuates in
response to the changes in productivity regimes
and normal macroeconomic shocks. Thus the shift
from low to high productivity in conjunction with
a policy authority adhering to a Svensson-Taylor
rule produces the events associated with the “new
economy” as described in the opening paragraph:
output persistently higher than expected, inflation
persistently lower than expected, measured produc-
tivity higher, and policymakers arguing that a pro-
ductivity shift has contained inflation. The reverse
case, a regime shift from high to low productivity,
generates some of the features of the stagflation of
the 1970s.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. First, we describe the model we will employ.
Then, we derive our optimal monetary policy rule
when there are regime switches in productivity; in
the next section we compare the economic perfor-
mance of our simple macroeconomy under the
Svensson-Taylor rule and under the optimal rule.
Then we offer some closing comments and use
two appendices to discuss mathematical details.
ENVIRONMENT
As in Svensson (1997), we assume that inflation
and the output gap are linked by the following
short-term Phillips curve relationship:
(1) ,
where πt=pt–pt–1 is the inflation rate from period
t–1 to period t; pt is the natural logarithm of the
price level in period t; yt is the natural logarithm of
the output gap at t; and the parameter α measures
the slope of the Phillips curve. We interpret ut as a
productivity (supply) shock, and we put more struc-
ture on it below. We normalize the natural level of
output to zero, so that yt is zero when output is at
this steady-state or “trend” level. Following Svensson
(1997, p. 1115), we assume that the output gap is
serially correlated, decreasing in the short-term
real interest rate and increasing in an exogenous
shock to the gap:
(2)
where β2>0, 0<β1<1, it is a short-term nominal
interest rate controlled by the monetary authority,
and xt+1 is a stochastic disturbance term. As can be
seen from equations (1) and (2), the real interest
rate affects the output gap with a one-period lag,
and hence affects inflation with a two-period lag,
which is the control lag in the model. The shock to
the output gap is serially correlated and assumed




We want to think in terms of persistent produc-
tivity regimes in which switches are relatively rare
events, corresponding to the U.S. productivity
experience in the postwar era. To study persistent
changes in productivity, we extend this system with
xx tt t ++ =+ 11 ρε .
yy i x tt t t t ++ =− − () + 11 2 1 ββπ ,
   ππ α tt t t yu ++ =+ − 11
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REVIEWa stochastic process for productivity, ut. We use a
two-state process defined by
(4)
where ah>a >0. Under this specification, as ah→0,
there is no difference between the regimes, and so
we think of ah as scaling the effect of the productivity
differences in the two regimes. The unobserved
state of the system st takes on a value of zero or one
and follows a two-state Markov process.2 There is an







Thus, the probability of remaining in the high (low)
state conditional on being in the high (low) state in
the previous period is p(q), the probability of switch-
ing from the high to the low state is 1–q, and the
probability of switching from the low state to the
high state is 1–p. Because we wish to think of per-




As suggested by Hamilton (1989), the stochastic
process for equation (6) admits the following AR(1)
representation:
(7)
where γ ≡ p+q–1 and υt is a discrete, white noise
process with mean zero and variance συ
2. From
equation (2) it follows that the unconditional mean
steady-state level of output, y –, associated with a
zero steady-state real interest rate is zero. To be
consistent, we impose that this level from equation




We give the details of this calculation in Appendix A.
Monetary policy is conducted by a central bank








   ap a h l =





































that controls a short-term nominal interest rate, it,
and that has an exogenously given inflation target,
π*. The authorities aim to minimize deviations of
inflation from this assigned target, on the one hand,
and fluctuations of output around its trend level
(which is normalized to zero, i.e., y –=0), on the
other. Consequently, the central bank will choose
a sequence of current and future short-term nomi-
nal rates to meet the objective
(9)
Here 0≤ µ<∞ represents the central bank’s
relative weight on output stabilization, while the
parameter δ ∈(0,1) denotes the discount factor.
The expectation is conditional on the central bank’s
information set in period t. This information set
contains the current output gap, yt, the current
inflation rate, πt, its forecast of the shock to the
output gap, xt+1, its forecast of the productivity
shock—which depends on the unobserved regime
st+1—and the structure of the economy as described
by equations (1) through (8).
IMPLEMENTING INFLATION
TARGETING
To get some straightforward results, we interpret
inflation targeting as implying strict inflation target-
ing, in the sense that inflation is the only argument
in the loss function (9). This means that we set µ=0.3
Applying (1–γL), where L is the lag operator
defined by Ljxt=xt–j, to equation (1) and taking
account of equation (4),
(10)
Substituting for (1–γL)st+1 from equation (7), we may
rewrite equation (10) as
(11)
where we have used the fact that 
π γ π γπ α αγ υ tt t t t h t yy a +− − + =+ () −+ − − 11 1 1 1,
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2 We adopt the usual convention that, for discrete-valued variables,
capital letters denote the random variable and small letters a particular
realization. If both interpretations apply we use small letters.
3 In the case where µ>0, the intuition and main findings change little
while the mathematics becomes considerably more complex. To keep
our main points clear we have simply decided to omit analysis of this
case. We discuss the µ=0 assumption in more detail near the end of
the paper..
Hence, in the absence of control, the combina-
tion of the Phillips curve (equation (1)) and the AR(1)
representation of the productivity state (equation
(7)) gives rise to a second-order stochastic difference
equation for inflation. An important limiting case
of equation (11) is when p=q=0.5; that is, in each
period either regime is equally likely to occur,
regardless of the current state. In this case the pro-
ductivity shock becomes serially uncorrelated and
the reduced form parameter γ →0. When this
occurs, the Phillips curve approaches the standard
Svensson (1997) first-order form.
We have noted that in the above model the
control lag is two periods. The current inflation rate
and the current output gap are predetermined vari-
ables that cannot be influenced by policy. Therefore,
the one-period-ahead inflation forecast is also pre-
determined4 (independently of the current level of
interest rates). However, by changing the current
nominal interest rate, the policymaker can affect the
one-period-ahead output gap forecast and thereby
the one-to-two-period inflation forecast. Thus, i0
affects E0y1, which in turn affects E0π2; i1 affects
E1y2, which in turn affects E1π3, and so on. The
proper intermediate target for policy is thus the one-
to-two-period inflation forecast, and the instrument
(control) of policy is the nominal interest rate at
time t, or equivalently the one-period-ahead output
gap forecast.
When µ→0, the above problem becomes
straightforward. The monetary authority then needs
to set Etyt+1 so as to ensure that (today’s forecast
of) the two-period-ahead inflation rate is equal to
the inflation target. Thus, we have π*=Etπt+2.5
Leading the inflation equation (1) by one period
and taking expectations at time t yields
(12) .
Setting this expression equal to the inflation target
and then rearranging gives the optimal value of the
control:
(13)
where the (predetermined) one-period-ahead infla-
tion forecast is given by6
(14) Ey E u tt t t tt ππ α ++ =+ − 11 .
Ey E Eu tt tt tt ++
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1/2, we get Etut+1=Etut+2=0 and the policy
rule (13) is identical to the optimal rule for the
Svensson (1997) model (for the case of strict infla-
tion targeting). This rule says that, if the one-period-
ahead inflation forecast exceeds the target, ceteris
paribus, the one-to-two-period inflation forecast
will exceed the target. To compensate, the policy-
maker then needs to contract next period’s forecast
of the level of the output gap in the economy.
We now want to think of p and q as substantially
greater than 
1/2, so that the model has persistent
favorable or unfavorable supply side developments—
regimes—which more closely approximate the
postwar U.S. experience.
If the current-period forecast of next period’s
productivity state is favorable (Etut+1>0), this has
two effects. In the first place it directly lowers the
one-period-ahead inflation forecast (see equation
(14)). This means that the central bank should allow
next period’s output gap to expand. The intuition is
that, to prevent inflation from falling too far below
the target, the demand side of the economy should
move in tandem with the supply side. Thus, the
sign of Etut+1 in equation (13), through Etπt+1, is
positive.
The second (or indirect) effect of a positive one-
period-ahead productivity forecast is through its
effect on the one-to-two-period productivity fore-
cast. More specifically, any given productivity state
is likely to persist into the future, so the expectation
of a high state next period implies a similar outlook
for the following period. In fact it can be shown that
(15)
(see Appendix C for details on the optimal predictor
for productivity). In turn, if Etut+2>0, the one-to-
two-period inflation forecast falls (see equation (12)),
allowing the central bank to expand next period’s
level of the output gap. Thus, the sign of Etut+2 in
equation (13) is also positive. Substituting the right-
hand sides of equation (14) for Etπt+1 and equation
(17) for Etut+2 in (15) gives
(16)
The first part of the expression for the optimal
Ey y Eu tt t t tt +
∗
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4 This can be seen by taking expectations at time t of equation (11).
This yields Etπt+1=(1+γ)πt–γπt–1+αyt–αγyt–1.
5 For a derivation of this condition, see Appendix B.
6 This can be seen by taking expectations at time t of equation (1).control, (–1/α)( πt+αyt – π*), is identical to the
Svensson (1997) derivation. This term can be inter-
preted as the demand component of the inflation
process. The second component, (1/α) (1+γ )Etut+1,
is new and contains the central bank’s optimal
reaction to its assessment of the (dis)inflationary
consequences of the future supply side of the
economy on the one-period-ahead and two-period-
ahead inflation forecasts (the terms (1/α) Etut+1 and
(γ /α) Etut+1, respectively).
In Appendix C we show that the central bank’s
optimal predictor for productivity is a function of
the lagged output gap and the current acceleration
of the inflation rate. That is,
(17)
where ∆ is the backward difference operator. Thus,
the central bank can use its observed values of yt–1
and ∆πt to forecast next period’s productivity level.
Substituting (17) into (16), we obtain
(18)
The term –γ∆πt suggests that, if inflation accelerates,
this is likely to be an indication of adverse develop-
ments on the supply side of the economy. Or, put
differently, an accelerating inflation rate is a leading
indicator of an adverse supply shock.
Similarly, the term αγyt–1 suggests that if last
period’s output gap was negative—meaning that one
period ago the economy was operating below its
long-run potential—this is not an indication of lack
of demand. Instead, it is indicative of the presence
of an adverse supply shock. Under strict inflation
targeting this means that the central bank demand
should contract (its forecast of) the output gap.
Otherwise, the policymaker risks further amplifying
the inflation process. Similarly, if last period’s out-
put gap was positive, it indicates a positive supply
shock, rather than excess demand. Now the central
bank should allow the output gap to widen, since
otherwise it risks creating disinflation.
Finally, using the fact that the one-period output
gap forecast fulfills
(19)
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γα γ γπ ∆ .
Eu y tt t t +− =− 11 αγ γ π ∆ ,
the central bank’s optimal monetary policy rule
(interest rate reaction function) can be written as 
(20)
.
The first two terms in the rule, involving (πt–π*)
and yt, are identical to those derived by Svensson
(1997). These terms can be viewed as the demand
components of the inflation process. The third and
fourth terms, involving ∆πt and yt–1, are new and
are leading indicators of future supply shocks.
An important limiting case of equation (20) is
when p=q=
1/2. Then γ →0 and the supply-side
terms drop out, so that the policy rule collapses to
(21)
which—as in Svensson (1997, p. 1119)—is essen-
tially a version of the simple policy rule popularized
by Taylor (1993).7 Another special case, less obvious
from equation (20), is when ah→0; here there is still
regime switching, but the two regimes approach
the same productivity levels and so the switching
does not have any effect.
We now turn to a calibrated case to illustrate
some of the differences between these rules.
COMPARING THE RULES
Calibration
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used
in our calibrated economy. We use standard, illus-
trative values for α, β1, and β2. The shock to the
output gap is quite persistent, with ρ=0.9. We chose
the shock ε from a uniform distribution with mini-
mum value –
1/2 and maximum value 
1/2. The value
of ah scales the size of the effects of a productivity
regime switch on the deviation of inflation from
the policymakers’ target value. Our choice of ah=1
limits this effect to 1 percentage point, but we could
scale it up or down by choosing other values. Finally,
we want to consider systems with very persistent
regimes, and so we set p=q=0.975, meaning that
the chance of switching out of a given regime is only
0.025 in any period.
rr y tt t −= − () +
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7 Taylor rules are often written in terms of nominal interest rates, but
given the definition of rt the rules in equations (20) and (21) can easily
be interpreted in these terms.Optimality
We begin by demonstrating the superiority of
the optimal rule given by equation (20) in the cali-
brated economy. Of course, in our derivation we
assumed µ=0, meaning that the monetary author-
ities in the model economy direct policy solely
toward keeping inflation near target because their
objective function only involves inflation deviations.
This was termed “strict inflation targeting” by
Svensson (1997). Accordingly, we consider the
asymptotic (t→∞) mean-squared inflation deviation
from target for both the optimal rule given by equa-
tion (20) and for the Svensson-Taylor rule given by
equation (21). We calculate the asymptotic mean-
squared inflation deviation through a simulation
using equations (1) through (3), and either (20) or
(21), for a large enough number of periods that the
mean-squared deviation no longer changes. Table 2
summarizes the results.
For baseline parameters, Table 2 indicates that
the optimal rule clearly dominates the Svensson-
Taylor rule, as expected, with an asymptotic mean-
squared inflation deviation of only 0.138, versus
0.996 for the Svensson-Taylor rule. The Svensson-
Taylor rule does not take account of the changing
nature of the supply side of the economy, and
thus policymakers using it would end up with a
suboptimally high inflation variance. As we have
emphasized, in two special cases the Svensson-
Taylor rule and the optimal rule perform equally
well. One of these occurs when the two productivity
regimes are not persistent, so that p=q=
1/2, and
other parameters are left as in the baseline case. In
this situation, regime switches occur as often as non-
switches, which merely adds to the noise in the
system and leaves the “leading indicator” feature
of the optimal rule impotent. The asymptotic loss
is then equal for the two rules at 0.521, as shown
in the second line of Table 2. The other special case
is when the two regimes are not very far apart,
which is the case when ah→0 in our model, and
all other parameters are again at baseline values
(including p and q). Here, regime switches occur,
but they are not quantitatively important because
the productivity levels in the two regimes are not
sufficiently different. The asymptotic loss is 0.021
for both rules, as shown in the third line of Table 2.
This is much smaller than in the other cases because
the lack of important regime switches reduces the






α Response of inflation to the output gap 0.5
β1 Output persistence 0.7
β2 Response of the output gap to the real interest rate 1
ρ Serial correlation in the shock to the output gap 0.9
σε
2 Variance of the shock to the output gap 0.084
ah Productivity scale factor 1
p Probability of high productivity, given high productivity 0.975
q Probability of low productivity, given low productivity 0.975
π* Policymaker’s inflation target 2.5
NOTE: We illustrate our analytical findings using this calibration.
Table 2
Asymptotic Loss




…with ah→0 0.021 0.021
NOTE: In the baseline case, there are quantitatively important,
persistent regimes. The optimal rule performs significantly
better in this case. If the regimes are not persistent (second
line) or not very different (third line), then the two rules perform
equally well.We now turn to a particular realization of the
model economy to illustrate some of the features
of the optimal policy rule. 
An Example
In Figure 1 we display the last 100 of 5,000
observations on inflation for simulated systems
for both the optimal rule and the Svensson-Taylor
rule. Both systems are calculated based on the same
realized sequence of shocks. We use 100 observa-
tions to keep the Figure relatively clear. Figure 2
illustrates the implications for the output gap. Since
our policymakers in these systems (under both
policy rules) are strict inflation targeters (µ=0), they
are of course only concerned with the inflation
deviations as pictured in Figure 1.
In the Figures, regime shifts are realized in
periods 0, 12, 28, 48, and 86. We think this provides
enough switches to understand the main effects of
the two rules. The primary feature of the optimal
rule is that it tends to bring the inflation rate much
closer to target following a productivity regime
switch. The Svensson-Taylor rule, which leaves the
policymakers without a response to the shifting
productivity of the economy, does not bring infla-
tion back toward its target; instead, regime shifts
are associated with persistent movements in the
level of inflation. In fact, inflation remains persis-
tently above or persistently below target depending
on the regime. Figure 1 clearly shows why the mean-
squared deviation of inflation from target is higher
for the Svensson-Taylor rule as compared with the
optimal rule, as the systems are allowed to continue
for a large amount of time.
It is interesting to see how the optimal rule
fares in a period following an unfavorable supply
disturbance, such as the regime switch realized in
period 28 in the two Figures. As inflation starts to
accelerate, the optimal rule fairly quickly infers the
persistent change in the inflation environment and
gets inflation back to target. This is in fact achieved
by amplifying the structural economic slowdown,
as shown in Figure 2. This is the correct policy
response because a negative output gap in this case
does not merely indicate lack of demand, but rather
is indicative of the presence of an adverse supply
shock. Thus, the optimal rule calls for contracting
demand so as to avoid amplifying the inflationary
effects of the low-productivity state. By way of
contrast, the Svensson-Taylor rule fails to bring infla-
tion down at all (even though the only goal here is to
control inflation). In fact, inflation does not increase
in response to the regime shift as much as under
the optimal rule, but it stays persistently above target
until the next regime shift is realized in period 48.
Thus, a monetary policy response that is driven
purely by demand factors amplifies the inflation
problems associated with adverse supply shocks.
We think that this “stagflation” example is reminis-
cent of the monetary policy responses of several
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Figure 1















NOTE: Inflation performance in model economies.











































sOrganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries in the 1970s.
From the perspective of the “new economy,”
we can also consider the policy response to favor-
able supply shocks, such as those realized in periods
12 and 48 when the economy switches to a high-
productivity state. Under the optimal policy the
productivity shock drives inflation below target, but
only temporarily. A few periods later inflation is
back on target. The Svensson-Taylor rule, however,
interprets the substantial increase in the output gap
in these periods as evidence of excess demand. The
central bank then responds by contracting aggregate
demand. This in turn amplifies the downturn in
inflation. As a result of systematically misreading
the data, inflation falls below the target. Worse, it
stays systematically below the target until the next
regime switch.
As we have stressed, our exposition has been
kept relatively simple by limiting the analysis to
the strict inflation-targeting case (µ=0). The case
when µ>0 is obviously an interesting extension in
a quantitative sense, but we think our main points
are better made in this simpler, strict inflation-
targeting environment. If there are going to be un-
observed shifts in productivity in the economy, then
the optimal stabilization policy is naturally going
to take these shifts into account. To accomplish
this, an optimal policy rule will consider past data
in addition to contemporaneous data in an effort to
identify whether or not a regime shift has occurred.
A policy rule that takes account of these factors is
clearly going to perform better than one that does
not. An optimal policy rule in the case with µ>0
will still have all of these features, except that it will
mitigate output fluctuations to some extent at the
expense of exacerbating fluctuations in inflation,
as policymakers will in that case be attempting to
optimally trade off these two types of fluctuations.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have investigated the implica-
tions of regime switching in productivity for optimal
monetary policy rules. Our economy is simple and
delivers a version of the Taylor rule as the optimal
stabilization policy when there are no regime shifts
in productivity. Thus, our analysis is able to isolate
the additional components of an optimal policy rule
in the face of persistent, unobserved productivity
improvements or declines. We find that the optimal
monetary policy rule in the regime-switching
environment incorporates information about the
changing nature of the supply side by considering
lagged terms on inflation deviations and the output
gap. We show that the optimal rule significantly
outperforms a rule that ignores these terms in a
quantitative simulation, provided the two regimes
are persistent and sufficiently different. These
conditions seem to characterize the postwar U.S.
experience, as many analyses date a persistent
productivity slowdown as beginning in the early
1970s followed by a “new economy” appearing in
the 1990s.
We think our main findings are intuitively
appealing and likely to carry over into more compli-
cated environments, but this of course remains an
open question, which we leave to future research.
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Appendix A
STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM






with EtVt+1=0 and σv
2=E(Vt
2)=p(1–p)p –+q(1–q)
(1–p –), where we have used that8
.
From equation (22) we see that E0Vt=0 for all
t>0. Using this fact, and iterating equation (7)
into the future, we can write
(23)           
where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on
information available at date zero (which need not
include observation of S0). Observing that E0St
can be interpreted as the probability that St=1
given information at time zero (denoted P0[St=1]),

























where p0≡ P0[S0=1]. From equation (24) we can
see that for large t the economy will be in the high
productivity state (state 1) with probability p – in
which case u would be ah–a . Similarly, the econ-
omy will be in the low productivity state (state 0)
with probability 1–p –, in which case u would be –a .
Hence, the expected long-run level of u (denoted as
u –) is
(25) .
From equation (2) it follows that the (unconditional
mean) steady-state level of output (y –) associated
with a zero steady-state real interest rate is zero. To
be consistent, we impose that this level from equa-
tion (1) should also be zero. Taking account of (25)
this implies
(26)
which is equation (8) in the main text.
ap a h l = ,
up aa h =− l
P00 1 Sp p p t
t = [] =+ − () γ ,
8 For more details see Hamilton (1989, pp. 360-63).66 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001
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Appendix B
DERIVATION OF THE FIRST-ORDER
CONDITION















where ct=αEtyt+1–Etut+2 is a new control vari-
able and zt=Etπt+1 is a new state variable.9 We
solve this problem using the method of Lagrange
multipliers. We denote the Lagrange multiplier by
λ and we write the Lagrangian as
(32)
.
     

























tt t t t h t
δπ

























yy i x tt t t t ++ =−− () + 11 2 1 ββπ .




















Equation (33) implies Etλt+1=0. Using this in equa-
tion (34) yields
(35)
Leading this expression one period and taking
expectations implies that
(36)
Since Etλt+1=0 and since zt+1=Et+1πt+2, we con-
clude that the first-order condition for strict infla-
tion targeting is given by
(37)
which is the expression used in the text.
Ett ππ +
∗ = 2 ,
EE z tt tt λπ ++
∗ =− − () 11 .






















9 This constraint is derived using the fact that πt+1, yt+1, and Et+1ut+2
can be written as Etπt+1+(πt+1–Etπt+1), Etyt+1+(yt+1–Etyt+1), and
Etut+2+(Et+1ut+2–Etut+2), respectively.
Appendix C
DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL
PREDICTOR FOR PRODUCTIVITY
Taking expectations at time t of equation (11)
we obtain
(38)
However, from equation (1) it follows that
(39) Ey E u tt t t tt ππ α ++ =+ − 11 .
Ey y tt t t t t ππ α γ π α γ +− =+ + − 11 ∆ .
Hence, consistency requires that –Etut+1=γ∆πt–
αγyt–1 or
(40)
Along similar lines we can derive that Etut+2=
αγyt–γEt∆πt+1. Using equation (40), we find that
(41) Eu Eu y tt tt t t ++ − == − () 21 1 γγ α γ γ π ∆ .
Eu y tt t t +− =− 11 αγ γ π ∆ .